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ham,	 SMU,	 Pace,	 and	 Vermont.	 Comments	 by	 Joshua	 Galpern,	 Cale	 Jaffe,	 Timothy	
Molloy,	and	others	at	the	Vermont	Environmental	Scholars	Colloquium	were	particu-






































Paul	 Manafort,	 among	 others.2	 The	 crime-fraud	 exception	 also	
 

























afort	 and	 Attorney-Client	 Privilege,	 JURIST	 (Nov.	 16,	 2017,	 4:53	 PM),	 https://www	
.jurist.org/commentary/2017/11/mueller-manafort-and-attorney-client-privilege	
[https://perma.cc/K5L3-X4NG].	Indeed,	one	could	argue	that	the	crime-fraud	excep-






























Division’s	 New	 Crime-Fraud	 Strategy,	 MARTINDALE	 (Oct.	 2,	 2019),	 https://www	
.martindale.com/legal-news/article_eversheds-sutherland-us-llp_2520885.htm.	
	 6.	 After	 FBI	 agents	 raided	 the	 law	 office	 of	 Trump’s	 attorney,	 the	 President	
tweeted	his	exasperation:	“Attorney-client	privilege	is	dead!”	Without	missing	a	beat,	
former	U.S.	Attorney	Preet	Bharara	(whom	Trump	had	fired)	tweeted	this	response:	






















olations	 of	 civil	 environmental	 law.	 Attorney-client	 communication	































conduct	 of	 the	 privilege	 holder,	 not	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 opponent.11	




















private	 parties	 to	 act	 as	 ‘private	 attorneys	 general’	 to	 compel	 government	 action	
and/or	require	that	regulated	entities	fully	comply	with	applicable	environmental	re-
quirements.”).	









	 13.	 Ellen	 Knickmeyer,	EPA	 Prosecutions	 of	 Polluters	 Approach	 Quarter-Century	
Lows,	 PBS:	NEWSHOUR	 (Nov.	 21,	 2019,	 2:04	 PM),	 https://www.pbs.org/newshour/	
nation/epa-prosecutions-of-polluters-approach-quarter-century-lows	[https://	
perma.cc/W7PT-GTA8];	Nicholas	Iovino,	Environmental	Prosecutions	Drop	to	Lowest	




































amination	of	 the	 attorney-client	 privilege.	Recognized	 in	 all	 federal	
and	state	courts	throughout	the	U.S.,	the	attorney-client	privilege	pre-
vents	 the	 compelled	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 communication	 be-
tween	attorney	and	client	where	the	purpose	of	such	communication	























sible	 vulnerabilities	 and	preparing	 for	pitfalls	 that	might	otherwise	




and	 client	 to	 share	 information	 and	 thereby	 assess	 whether	 they	
would	be	a	good	match;	without	such	a	safe	haven,	mismatches	could	
be	more	common	and	could	harm	the	interests	of	both	lawyers	and	





The	 attorney-client	 privilege	 helps	 clients	 maintain	 their	 pri-
vacy.20	 This	 consideration	 could	 be	 important	 to	 clients	 for	 whom	
some	aspects	 of	 a	 pending	matter	might	be	 embarrassing	 if	widely	
known.	Whether	or	not	the	subject	matter	of	a	case	is	sensitive,	a	client	
















































of	 information	held	by	 attorneys	usually	 include	 exceptions	 for	 situations	 in	which	
lawyers’	services	are	at	issue,	such	as	when	clients	file	malpractice	claims	or	bring	eth-









































































tion.	The	U.S.	 Supreme	Court	has	 embraced	 this	 logic	 in	 exempting	
from	the	attorney-client	privilege	instances	in	which	the	client	seeks	
the	attorney’s	help	to	commit	an	ongoing	or	future	crime	or	fraud.33	



























































































As	 a	 practical	matter,	 application	 of	 the	 crime-fraud	 exception	
tends	to	be	difficult	and	rare	because	both	attorney	and	client	are	usu-
ally	reluctant	to	share	information	that	would	prove	the	predicates	for	
the	 exception.	 Recognizing	 this	 difficulty,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	
other	appellate	courts	have	developed	a	 fairly	well-defined	body	of	










































present.47	 Several	 jurisdictions	have	equated	a	prima	 facie	showing	
with	the	amount	of	proof	necessary	to	establish	probable	cause.48	The	
judge,	not	the	jury,	determines	whether	the	showing	is	adequate.49	In	




quired	 for	 the	 crime-fraud	 exception	 has	 drawn	 criticism	 from	
 
























by	the	client	 to	 foster	a	crime	or	 fraud”	 in	order	to	overcome	the	privilege);	United	
States	v.	Martin,	278	F.3d	988,	1001	(9th	Cir.	2002)	(“The	[crime-fraud]	exception	ap-
plies	only	when	there	is	‘reasonable	cause	to	believe	that	the	attorney’s	services	were	
utilized	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	ongoing	unlawful	 scheme.’”	 (quoting	 In	 re	 Grand	 Jury	
Proc.,	87	F.3d	377,	381	(9th	Cir.	1996)));	In	re	Grand	Jury,	705	F.3d	133,	153	(3d	Cir.	













































	 55.	 President	 Donald	 Trump’s	 personal	 attorney,	 Michael	 Cohen,	 ardently	 de-
fended	the	President	and	invoked	the	attorney-client	privilege	to	shield	certain	docu-
ments	and	information	from	outsiders’	view,	but	when	Cohen	himself	was	under	in-
















sidering	 privileged	 information	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 litigation,	 does	 not	
foreclose	in	camera	review	of	allegedly	privileged	materials	or	testi-
mony.60	Furthermore,	the	Court	decided	that	the	opponent	of	the	priv-
ilege	need	not	offer	evidence	of	 crime	or	 fraud	 that	 is	wholly	 inde-
pendent	 of	 the	 materials	 under	 in	 camera	 review.61	 The	 party	
requesting	in	camera	must,	at	a	minimum,	show	a	“factual	basis	ade-










































otherwise	 represent	 fairly	 straightforward	 applications	 of	 current	
law.	







ing	 Trump’s	 presidential	 campaign.70	 When	 Trump	 later	 faced	 im-
peachment	on	the	ground	that	he	had	withheld	military	aid	to	Ukraine	
until	 its	 leaders	cooperated	 in	the	 investigation	of	Trump’s	political	


































forfeited	 the	privilege	when	she	 tried	 to	enlist	her	attorney’s	aid	 in	
providing	false	sworn	testimony	about	the	affair.72		
The	 crime-fraud	 exception	 has	 also	 facilitated	 prosecutions	 of	
prominent	campaign	officials.	Paul	Manafort	and	Rick	Gates,	both	of	






















































counsel	 to	make	arrangements	 for	witness	 tampering	and	suppres-
sion	of	reports	concerning	the	defendant’s	sexual	impropriety.78	Such	
misuse	of	the	attorney-client	relationship	could	possibly	support	the	





Virtually	 all	 of	 the	 foregoing	 cases	 involved	 crimes	 or	 alleged	
crimes,	but	there	is	at	least	one	prominent	example	of	a	civil	suit	that	
successfully	utilized	the	crime-fraud	exception	without	any	claim	of	
criminal	 activity.	 In	 the	1990s,	 the	 state	of	Minnesota	 sued	various	
companies	 that	 produced	 and	 marketed	 tobacco	 products.81	 Like	
many	other	plaintiffs	bringing	such	suits	in	the	past,	Minnesota	had	













































	 86.	 Id.	 at	 479.	C.	 Everett	 Koop,	 then	 the	 surgeon	 general	 of	 the	 United	 States,	


































The	 limit	 constrains	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 exception	 in	 modern	
times.	Given	that	virtually	all	fraud	is	potentially	subject	to	prosecu-




compelling	 a	 case	 for	 the	 exception	 as	 does	 a	 mere	misdemeanor.	
Why,	then,	is	the	crime-fraud	exception	so	constrained?	
One	possible	explanation	is	that	the	odd	boundaries	of	the	crime-






has	been	used	primarily	 in	grand	 jury	 settings);	1	ROBERT	P.	MOSTELLER,	KENNETH	S.	
BROUN,	GEORGE	E.	DIX,	EDWARD	J.	IMWINKELRIED,	DAVID	H.	KAYE	&	ELEANOR	SWIFT,	MCCOR-













































to	 commit	 simpler	 crimes.96	 Thus,	 the	unique	 value	of	 attorneys	 to	
fraudulent	 schemes	 is	one	 factor	 that	 justifies	establishing	a	 severe	
penalty—and	formidable	deterrent—by	revoking	the	attorney-client	
privilege	in	such	instances.	
A	 second	 reason	 why	 fraud	 should	 forfeit	 the	 attorney-client	
privilege	is	that	this	misconduct	preys	on	vulnerable	victims.	Perpe-
trators	 of	 fraud	 commonly	 seek	 to	 dupe	 elderly	 people	 and	 others	
whose	credulousness,	cognitive	impairments,	or	lack	of	sophistication	
make	 them	 easier	 marks.97	 Victims	 of	 fraud	 are	 almost	 never	
 






























and	 invoking	 the	 attorney-client	 privilege,	 the	 injustice	 is	manifest	
and	the	plaintiff’s	odds	of	presenting	adequate	proof	are	long	indeed.	











































attorney-client	 communication	when	 clients	 have	 tried	 to	 entangle	
























gued	 that	documents	at	 issue	concealed	 full	extent	of	environmental	contamination	
from	government	regulators,	could	not	show	that	document	constituted	a	fraud	within	
the	meaning	of	the	crime-fraud	exception);	Symposium,	Groundwater	Pollution	Panel,	





























application	 of	 the	 exception	 to	 those	 categories	 of	 misconduct	 ex-
pressly	mentioned—crimes	and	noncriminal	frauds—thereby	exclud-




article’s	 proposal.	 How	 do	 the	 privilege	 rules,	 as	 modified	 by	 the	





strictive	 than	 the	privilege	rules,	 then	expansion	of	 the	crime-fraud	
exception	could	be	efficacious.	
 






Chevron	Corp.	 v.	Donziger,	 INSIDE	COUNS.	 (Aug.	25,	2014),	https://www.gibsondunn	
.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/ThomsonAdzhemyan	
-LitigatingTheCrimeFraudException.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/Y94P-XLMH]	 (reviewing	
defense	counsel’s	successful	use	of	 the	crime-fraud	exception	 to	obtain	 information	
that	plaintiff’s	counsel	claimed	to	be	privileged);	Jack	Newsham,	Donziger	Faces	Crim-
inal	 Contempt	 Prosecution	 Team	 at	 Seward	 &	 Kissell,	 LAW.COM	 (Aug.	 13,	 2019),	
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/13/donziger-faces-criminal	
-contempt-prosecution-team-at-seward-kissel/?slreturn=20190802230543	[https://	




















enforcement	 authority—any	 type	 of	 criminal	 activity	 by	 the	 client	





































































used	 attorneys’	 services).	 In	 some	 respects,	 these	 provisions	 seem	 to	 mirror	 the	
“fraud”	prong	of	the	current	crime-fraud	exception.	
	 114.	 See	Victor	B.	Flatt,	Disclosing	the	Danger:	State	Attorney	Ethics	Rules	Meet	Cli-













cases;	 other	 categories	 of	 attorneys	 and	 other	 settings	 are	 ex-
empted.116	Second,	the	rule	does	not	limit	other	means	through	which	





proximately	 half	 of	 the	 states	 have	 not	 adopted	 this	model	 rule.119	
Fifth,	even	in	states	that	have	adopted	it,	some	authority	suggests	that	












































































erence	 statute(s)	 and/or	 regulation(s)	 setting	 forth	 pollutants	 and	
threshold	quantities	subject	to	this	exception]		
 














ception,	 the	 court	 may	 consider	 the	 information	 and	materials	 as	 to	
which	 the	claimant	seeks	 to	apply	 the	privilege,	along	with	any	other	
evidence	and	information	that	the	court	may	properly	consider	under	











































mental	 crimes,124	 which	would	 enhance	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	 present	
crime-fraud	exception.	For	all	 these	reasons,	 it	 is	preferable	 for	 the	
new	environmental	exception	to	complement	rather	than	replace	the	
long-standing	crime-fraud	exception.	









referencing	 avoids	 cluttering	 the	 state’s	 evidence	 code	 with	 a	 vast	
amount	of	highly	technical	language.	It	also	could	allow	deference	to	











n.1	 (listing	 several	 states	 that	had	adopted	a	 rule	 similar	 to	proposed	Federal	Rule	
503(d)(1)	as	of	1986).	
	 124.	 For	a	searchable	database	that	includes	both	bills	and	enacted	legislation,	see	























When	 environmental	 advocates	 urge	 legislators	 to	 adopt	 the	 new	
KELP	exception,	they	will	be	able	to	argue	that	it	sets	a	higher	bar	for	
culpability	than	already	exists	under	current	law.	





other	Supreme	Court	holdings	relating	 to	evidence	 law,	such	as	 the	
holding	in	Daubert	v.	Merrell	Dow	Pharmaceuticals	concerning	the	ad-
missibility	of	expert	testimony127	and	the	holding	in	Bourjaily	v.	United	
States	 concerning	 the	 admissibility	 of	 co-conspirator	 statements.128	
Not	only	will	the	inclusion	of	Zolin’s	language	improve	the	odds	that	
practitioners	 and	 judges	 see	 it,	 but	 subsection	 2)	will	 also	 prevent	
state	courts	from	adding	procedural	requirements	that	will	reduce	the	
success	of	objections	based	on	crime,	fraud,	or	KELP.	Zolin	is	not	a	con-


































also	 the	most	 straightforward:	 signaling	 to	would-be	 violators.	 The	
law	should	signal	plainly	that	lawyers	may	not	aid	and	abet	knowing	
violations	of	environmental	law,	especially	violations	involving	emis-
sion	 of	 pollutants	 in	 dangerous	 quantities	 (a	 list	 that	 presumably	


























































used	to	 further	a	crime	or	 fraud,	such	activity	hardly	qualifies	as	 ‘professional	 legal	
services,’	an	essential	element	of	the	privilege.”).	










question	 about	 the	 practical	 importance	 of	 this	 Article’s	 proposal:	
don’t	federal	statutes	criminalize	most	knowing	emission	of	listed	pol-
lutants?	The	Clean	Water	Act	(CWA),	the	Clean	Air	Act	(CAA),	and	the	














	 138.	 See	 generally	 David	 Uhlmann,	 Prosecutorial	 Discretion	 and	 Environmental	
Crime,	38	HARV.	ENV’T	L.	REV.	159,	167–71	(2014)	(discussing	the	requisite	mens	rea	in	
environmental	crimes).	








tal	 law,	 if	 committed	knowingly,	 are	 criminally	 enforceable.	The	 three	 statutes	 that	
cover	the	spectrum	of	criminal	punishment	for	the	release	of	toxins	into	the	environ-


















party	 has	 sought	 to	 involve	 an	 attorney	 in	 committing	 a	 crime	 or	
fraud.142	 In	reality,	 though,	 the	vast	majority	of	 litigants	who	utilize	
the	crime-fraud	exception	to	overcome	the	attorney-client	privilege	
are	 prosecutors,	 usually	 invoking	 the	 exception	 at	 the	 grand	 jury	
phase	of	an	investigation.143	When	a	civil	litigant	tries	to	use	the	crime-
fraud	exception	in	a	case	that	has	not	been	subject	to	prosecution,	the	
government’s	 absence	 is	 conspicuous.144	 Claimants	 of	 the	 attorney-
























































fraud	 justifies	 abrogating	 the	 attorney-client	 privilege.150	 A	 careful	
 
































84	 (S.D.N.Y.	2016)	 (noting	 that	plaintiffs	were	able	 to	 invoke	 fraud	prong	of	 crime-









plaint	 unless	 the	proof	 can	meet	 the	preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence	
standard.152	More	likely,	though,	a	judge	will	note	the	omission	of	the	
fraud	claim	from	the	complaint	and	assume	that	the	plaintiff	does	not	
believe	 a	 fraud	 claim	would	 have	 an	 adequate	 factual	 basis,	 so	 the	
court	should	not	use	it	as	a	basis	to	pierce	the	attorney-client	privilege.	















The	 divergence	 of	 states’	 criminal	 environmental	 statutes	 pro-
vides	 another	 reason	 to	 adopt	 this	 Article’s	 proposal.	 While	 most	
 













	 153.	 Fried,	supra	note	56,	at	461	(raising	concerns	about	 “circularity”	when	 the	
crime-fraud	 exception	 is	 the	means	 through	which	 the	 party	 piercing	 the	 privilege	




















privilege	 claimant	 has	 violated	 federal	 criminal	 law	 does	 not	 seem	
meritorious	in	the	absence	of	a	federal	prosecution.158	
Variation	 and	 unpredictability	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 crime-
fraud	exception	are	undesirable.159	The	benefits	of	confidentiality—
and	of	exceptions	to	confidentiality—are	greatest	when	the	bounda-










Statutes,	 14	ECOLOGY	L.Q.	 117	 (1987),	which	 includes	 a	 chart	 showing	 variations	 in	
states’	criminal	environmental	 law	statutes;	and	H.	Allen	Irish,	Enforcement	of	State	































trial	 judges,	 virtually	no	 judge	has	 significant	 experience	with	 such	
prosecutions.162	Some	judges	may	be	incredulous	when	prosecutors	
explain	that	criminal	environmental	statutes	set	a	 low	bar	for	mens	
























Disrupting	 Environmental	 Crime	 at	 the	 Local	 Level:	 An	Operational	 Perspective,	 PAL-
GRAVE	COMMC’NS	(2017)	(“[V]ery	often	judges	and	magistrates	do	not	seem	to	take	en-
vironmental	crime	seriously.”);	THEODORE	M.	HAMMETT	&	JOEL	EPSTEIN,	LOCAL	PROSECU-

























ries	 of	 offenses	 now	 covered	 by	 the	 crime-fraud	 exception:	misde-









mental	 states	 of	 corporate	 constituents,	 even	where	 no	 individual	 constituent	 pos-


















tions	 involving	 KELP	 (i.e.,	 knowing	 emission	 of	 listed	 pollutants)	
necessarily	involve	a	more	culpable	mens	rea	than	would	be	sufficient	
for	the	lowest-level	misdemeanors.171	Because	the	crime-fraud	excep-












Ct.	 App.	 2017)	 (applying	 crime-fraud	 exception	 to	 misdemeanor	 offense);	 Micron	
Tech.,	Inc.	v.	Rambus	Inc.,	645	F.3d	1311,	1330–31	(Fed.	Cir.	2011)	(same);	In	re	3dfx	






















or	 unintentional	 misdemeanor	 violation	 of	 environmental	 law.	 No	 published	 case	





















stances	 strengthen	 the	 case	 to	 treat	 KELP	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 as	
 
environmental	 prosecutions	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 misdemeanor	 violations	 are	
probably	a	low	priority	among	the	various	categories	of	criminal	violations	that	pros-
ecutors	could	charge.	See	supra	note	146.	Perhaps	it	could	be	possible	for	attorney-



























































































in	 order	 to	 gather	 proof	 of	 collusion	 among	 several	 defendants,	 so	














swer	 to	 charges	 actually	 brought	 by	 the	 grand	 jury	 and	 not	 a	 prosecutor’s	
interpretation	of	the	charges,	that	the	defendant	is	apprised	of	the	charges	against	him	
in	 order	 to	 permit	 preparation	 of	 his	 defense,	 and	 that	 the	 defendant	 is	 protected	
against	 double	 jeopardy.”	 U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	 JUST.,	CRIMINAL	RESOURCE	MANUAL	 §	223:	RE-
QUIREMENT	OF	SPECIFICITY,	https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-223	
-requirement-specificity	[https://perma.cc/RJ8L-4S7X].	
















tion	would	 likely	 focus	 on	 the	 precise	 crime	 charged	 in	 the	 indict-
ment.191		
C. GREATER	ACCOUNTABILITY	FOR	PAST	POLLUTION	












indicating	 the	 defendants	were	 knowingly	 causing	 harm	 to	 human	
health.	An	early	attempt	to	invoke	the	crime-fraud	exception	in	the	to-



























































































PROC.	 446,	 446	 (2009),	 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2676127	





































Example	 #2:	 An	 officer	 of	 a	 corporation	 asked	 a	 lawyer	 to	
threaten	 retaliation	 against	 an	 employee	who	 could	 potentially	 be-
come	a	whistleblower	 concerning	KELP	at	 one	of	 the	 corporation’s	
plants.	The	 lawyer	did	what	 the	 client	 requested.	This	 threat	 facili-
tated	the	continuation	of	KELP.	The	threat	was	neither	criminal	nor	





ance	of	KELP.	 (Alternatively,	 a	 third-party	 received	an	errant	email	
setting	forth	such	communication.)	Now	plaintiffs	want	to	bring	an	en-
vironmental	suit	against	the	corporation.	The	evidence	does	not	sup-
port	 a	 fraud	 claim,	 and	 prosecutors	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 file	 criminal	
charges.	Plaintiffs	want	to	call	the	third-party	as	a	trial	witness	(or	of-
fer	the	email	as	an	admission	by	a	party	opponent)	in	order	to	prove	














Example	 #4:	 The	 government	 tried	 to	 bring	 a	 criminal	 case	
against	a	polluter,	but	that	prosecution	failed	for	some	reason.	Either	

















rea.211	 Environmental	 plaintiffs	 realize	 that	 the	 standards	 in	 a	 civil	
case	will	not	be	so	strict,	so	they	sue	to	recover	damages	for	the	cor-






THE	L.	GOVERNING	LAWS.	§	71,	 cmts.	b,	 c	 (AM.	L.	INST.	2000)	 (clarifying	 that	when	 the	








	 211.	 The	 leading	case	allowing	 the	aggregation	of	 corporate	mens	 rea	 is	United	
States	v.	Bank	of	New	England,	821	F.2d	844,	855–56	(1st	Cir.	1987),	which	approved	
the	use	of	a	collective	standard	for	mens	rea	in	a	corporate	prosecution,	such	that	the	
























ent	has	sought	assistance	 from	his	attorney	 to	 further	conduct	 that	
theoretically	could	count	as	both	an	environmental	crime	and	as	civ-



















YALE	L.J.	2195	(2003)	(reviewing	some	of	 the	 immunity	rules	 that	apply	 in	criminal	
prosecutions	 of	 government	 officials);	 James	 Buchwalter,	 Paul	 Coltoff,	 Cecily	 Fuhr,	



























ent	 contemplating	 these	 environmental	 violations	 would	 be	 to	 ad-




















































































This	 Part	 considers	 possible	 objections	 to	 the	 proposals	 dis-
cussed	above.	Space	constraints	limit	the	extent	of	the	analysis	in	the	
following	Subparts,	but	it	is	useful	to	list	and	begin	responding	to	cer-












crime-fraud	exception.	Most	 of	 the	misconduct	 subject	 to	 the	KELP	
 

























fidentiality	 presumes	 that	 attorney-client	 communication	 is	 not	 al-
ready	“chilled”	by	distrust	under	current	circumstances.	In	fact,	how-
ever,	 the	 current	 version	 of	 the	 crime-fraud	 exception	 engenders	
distrust	between	lawyer	and	client,	in	part	because	the	nonuniformity	
in	jurisdictions’	interpretation	of	the	crime-fraud	exception	makes	the	
security	 of	 confidentiality	 unpredictable.227	 This	 Article’s	 proposal	
would	 likely	 enhance	 predictability	 by	 improving	 uniformity,	 and	
might	thereby	improve	clients’	trust	of	their	lawyers	as	the	bounda-
ries	become	more	clear.	
Third,	 recent	 history	 has	 shown	 that	 alarmist	 predictions	 con-


























































































Client	 autonomy,	 however,	 does	 not	 necessitate	 lawyers’	 com-
plicity	in	lawbreaking.	It	is	well	settled	that	lawyers	should	not	assist	
clients	in	violating	the	law.239	When	clients	instruct	their	lawyers	to	
























interest	 rules	 when	 they	 abide	 by	 disclosure	 obligations.241	 If	 that	
were	 the	 case,	 the	 conflict	 rules	 would	 preempt	 the	 disclosure	























































culpable	 intent	 justify	 abrogating	 attorney-client	 privilege.	 The	 Su-
preme	Court	has	made	the	task	somewhat	easier	by	setting	a	low	bar	
for	 the	 required	quantum	of	proof—which	some	 lower	courts	have	
equated	with	 the	probable	 cause	 standard246—and	 in	 camera	 hear-
ings	 sometimes	 present	 an	 opportunity	 to	 question	 the	 privilege	
holder	and	other	“insiders.”247	These	same	techniques	would	still	be	
available	 after	 expansion	 of	 the	 crime-fraud	 exception	 to	 include	
KELP.	








operation	 by	 one	 criminal	 defendant	 in	 the	 government’s	
investigation	of	another	suspect,	and	might	create	similar	opportuni-
ties	 to	expose	 information	 that	allies	had	previously	kept	confiden-
tial.250	It	is	also	possible	that	defendants	will	disclose	attorney-client	


































dress	 judges’	 concerns.	 Judicial	 education	 programs	 could	 improve	
judges’	 understanding	 of,	 and	 comfort	 with,	 scientific	 evidence.253	
Similarly,	CLE	training	for	lawyers	could	help	standardize	and	stream-
line	the	presentation	of	proof.	Some	jurisdictions	might	opt	to	create	
























basis	 for	 overcoming	 the	 attorney-client	 privilege.	 As	 noted	 previ-
ously,	 violations	 of	 civil	 environmental	 law	 present	 a	 particularly	
compelling	case	 for	extension	of	 the	crime-fraud	exception	because	
they	are	similar	in	many	respects	to	the	civil	frauds	now	covered	by	






















This	 fear	 seems	 to	be	unfounded.	The	attorney-client	privilege	


















seek	advice	 from	 the	most	 competent	 counselors;	 those	 licensed	 to	
practice	law.260	Even	if	nonlawyers	could	conceivably	be	adept	at	this	

































	 261.	 Michele	 Cotton,	 Improving	 Access	 to	 Justice	 by	 Enforcing	 the	 Free	 Speech	
Clause,	83	BROOK.	L.	REV.	111,	111	(2017)	(“State	laws	against	the	unauthorized	prac-






































to	 crime-fraud	 objections	 brought	 by	 prosecutors	 rather	 than	 civil	 plaintiffs’	 attor-
neys).	
